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LEGISLATIVE COMMENT
DO NOT RESUSCITATE ORDERS: A MATTER
OF LIFE AND DEATH IN NEW YORK
Sciencel true daughter of Old Time art!
Who alterest all things with thy peering eyes.
Why preyest thou thus upon the poet's heart,
Vulture, whose wings are dull realities?
How should he love thee? Or how deem thee wise?
Who would not leave him in his wanderings
To seek for treasure in the jewelled skies..
Sonnet-To Science
Edgar Allan Poe
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") is the process of bringing a per-
son back from the brink of death by restoring the person's heartbeat and
breathing after "cardiac arrest" - the point at which a person's heart has
stopped functioning.' CPR typically involves a number of medical proce-
dures, including cardiac massage, insertion of endotracheal tubes to provide
oxygen, injections of medication into the heart or veins, use of defibrillators
to give electric shocks to induce heart contractions, and similar methods.2
Cardiac arrest occurs at some point in the dying process of every person.3
Because a person will die within a very few minutes without a heartbeat, a
decision whether or not to perform CPR must be made immediately upon
cardiac arrest.4 A "do not resuscitate" ("DNR") order instructs the hospi-
tal staff that CPR is not to be administered on a patient if that patient suffers
a respiratory or cardiac arrest.5
In the absence of legislative guidelines, there is a substantial question
whether DNR orders are legal, and whether hospital personnel can be held
1. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVORIAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT, 231 (March 1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
2. See J. Robertson, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL, 71 (1983). The President's
Commission estimated that the cost of resuscitation is commonly over $1,000, an estimate
which does not include the derivative costs in caring for a surviving patient who suffers from
side effects. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 244 n.44.
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 235.
4. Id
5. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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liable for the issuance of a DNR order. For example, prior to the enactment
of a DNR law in New York state, physicians, unsure of their potential liabil-
ity, regularly opted not to issue DNR orders even when they believed such
orders to be appropriate.6 One New York physician was quoted as saying:
Older physicians are afraid of putting "do not resuscitate" down
because they are afraid of being sued for making a wrong decision.
The younger physicians are anxious to put a "do not resuscitate"
down because they are afraid of being sued for making a wrong
decision. The nurses will not act without a "do not resuscitate"
because they are afraid of being sued.7
In December 1984, New York Governor Mario Cuomo appointed a
twenty-three member commission to review and propose legislation to help
the state legislature respond to a range of issues pertaining to medicine and
morality, including DNR orders.8 The New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law published its detailed recommendations in April 1986.'
On August 7, 1987, the State of New York enacted a comprehensive law
pertaining to the issuance of DNR orders."0 The law, which is based on the
6. See Letter from Stuart Showalter, Director, Division of Legal Services of the Catholic
Health Association of the United States, quoted in a letter from John E. Curley, Jr., President
of CHA, to the President's Commission (March 25, 1982), reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION, supra note 1, at 239 n.31 ("[C]ommon sense is often subordinated to a hysterical reaction
to the possibility of litigation."); Personal communication from Joel Glass, attorney with Ack-
erman, Salwen, and Glass, New York City, to Joanne Lynn (Jan. 10, 1983), reprinted in PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1. at 239 n.31 ("Few DNR orders are being written for
incompetent patients in New York State at present, largely because district attorneys state that
they consider such orders to be illegal and subject to criminal prosecution."). '
7. Testimony of Dr. Albert Fine, transcript of 10th meeting of the President's Commis-
sion for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(President's Commission) (June 4, 1981) at 95, reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra
note 1, at 239.
8. Severo, Cuomo Appoints 23 to Study Issues in Medical Technology, N.Y. Times, Dec.
23, 1984, at A22, col. 1.
9. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, Do NOT RESUSCITATE
ORDERS (1986) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
10. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2960-2978. (McKinney 1987). The law is a result of the
Task Force's report and a grand jury investigation conducted in New York state during 1983.
The grand jury found that, rather than put DNR orders in any form of a writing that could
incriminate them, physicians would use other, less obvious methods to convey that a DNR
order had been issued. Sullivan, New York State Drafts Right-To-Die Guidelines, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 13, 1987, at B4, col. 5. For example, physicians at La Guardia Hospital in Queens, N.Y.
had ordered small purple dots attached to the medical charts of terminally ill patients to sig-
nify that a DNR order had been issued. Id. Physicians at the Memorial Sloan-Kettering
Cancer Center wrote DNR orders on a blackboard which was erased after the order was car-
ried out. Id. The grand jury also found that hospitals used "slow codes" to reach the same
outcome. Under a "slow code", the physicians and nurses would use delaying tactics to make
sure that any effort to utilize CPR would fail. By responding with a "slow code" the hospital
could still tell the family of the patient that everything had been done to save the patient. Id.;
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recommendations of the Task Force, establishes a presumption in favor of
the patient's implied consent to CPR, but also establishes the lawfulness of a
DNR order if the order is issued in compliance with the law." The law
allows an adult with capacity to authorize a DNR order in conjunction with
his or her attending physician. Where an adult lacks capacity, or the patient
is a minor, the law allows for the appointment of a surrogate who may de-
cide, in concert with the patient's physician, to issue a DNR order. The law
specifies that a DNR order does not constitute consent to the withholding or
withdrawal of any medical treatment other than CPR. 2 Additionally, the
law specifies that the issuance of a DNR order shall not legally impair, mod-
ify or invalidate any life insurance policy, and that a DNR order can neither
be required nor prohibited by any insurance policy. 3 The law also provides
for a dispute mediation system and a judicial appeal process to help resolve
disputes between interested parties. Finally, the law extends immunity both
see Report of the Special January Third Additional Grand Jury Concerning "Do Not Resusci-
tate" Procedures at a Certain Hospital in Queens County, (Sup. Ct., Queens Co., Feb. 8, 1984);
see also Margolick, Hospital is Investigated on Life-Support Policy, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1982,
at A34; Sullivan, Hospitals Seek Rules on Withholding Life-Support, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17,
1982, at B3; In re Grand Jury Proceedings: People v. Doe, No. 333 (N.Y. Ct. App. June 18,
1982).
11. After approximately one year of study, the Task Force concluded that legislation re-
garding DNR orders was essential to "create uniform practices and to clarify the rights, au-
thority and protections afforded patients, family members, and health care professionals in the
issuance of [DNR] orders." TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 15. See also Note, To Die or Not to
Die: The New York Legislature Ponders A Natural Death Act, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 630
(1985). Another study which reviewed DNR orders was published by the President's Com-
mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavorial Re-
search. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1.
12. Under the law, CPR does not include measures to improve ventilation and cardiac
functions in the absence of an arrest. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(4). In this way, the law
requires that routine care be provided to patients who have requested a DNR order. The law
explicitly does not require a hospital to expand its existing equipment or facilities to provide
CPR. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2962(4). This decision is in accord with the report of the
President's Commission, which stated that "an order not to resuscitate holds no necessary
implications for any other therapeutic decisions." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at
9. The Task Force report not only states that the issuance of a DNR order should have no
effect on the provision of ordinary care, but adds that a DNR order can never justify discharg-
ing a patient from the hospital since presumably the patient for whom a DNR order is issued is
terminally ill, and needs special care during the dying process. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at
22.
13. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2975(l),(2). Indeed, the Task Force believed that the
decision to perform CPR should be completely divorced from concerns regarding insurance
coverage. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 46. The President's Commission took the insurance
issue one step further; "the level or extent of health care that will be reimbursed under public
or private insurance programs should never be linked to [DNR] orders." PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION, supra note 1, at 9.
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to hospital personnel and to those individuals who participate in the media-
tion process.
Although enacted on August 7, 1987, the law became effective on April 1,
1988, with any additions, amendments or repeal of any necessary rule or
regulation as authorized and directed to be made and completed prior to the
effective date. 14 In the interim period, the law authorized the New York
State Commissioner of Health, after consultation with the Commissioners of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, to
prepare a statement summarizing the rights, duties and requirements of the
law. The statement was to be distributed by hospitals to their patients and to
individuals authorized by the law to act as a patient's surrogate in making a
decision regarding CPR (if those individuals are known to the hospital at or
prior to the time of the patient's admission). The statement was then to be
distributed to all members of the hospital staff who were involved in provid-
ing medical care. The statement was also to be posted in a public place in
each hospital.
On February 4, 1988, the Commissioner promulgated regulations to im-
plement the statute. The regulation makes an almost verbatim statement of
the law applicable to medical facilities. 5 The regulation also makes the law
applicable to residential health care facilities. 6 Additionally, the Commis-
sioner has required all hospitals to ensure that each member of the hospital's
staff involved in providing medical care is trained in the requirements of the
law. Each hospital is also required to post in a public place the hospital's
policy governing the rights, duties and requirements of the DNR orders. 7
This legislative comment will first analyze the New York DNR law as it
pertains to an adult with capacity, an adult who lacks capacity, and a minor.
It will then review the process for revoking a DNR order, the requirements
of mandatory physician review of DNR orders, the policy on institutional
transfers, the workings of the dispute mediation process, and the immunity
granted by the law. Throughout the paper's description of these aspects of
the New York statute, it will compare the New York law to the recommen-
dations in the Governors' Task Force report, to a similar study conducted by
the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
14. The law became effective April 1, 1988 and it appeared that during the interim the
medical industry continued on as it had before legislation: under self-regulation. For an exam-
ple of self-regulated guidelines relating to DNR orders, see MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK, Do NOT RESUSCITATE GUIDELINES FOR HOSPITALS, PHYSICIANS AND
NURSING HOMES (Sept. 9, 1982, as amended Nov. 11, 1985).
15. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.42 (1988). Differences between the
law and the Commissioner's rule will be noted throughout this text.
16. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 414.23 (1988).
17. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10 § 405.42 (1988).
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and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and to the existing common law
relating to DNR orders.
1. WHETHER A DNR ORDER SHOULD BE ISSUED
A. A Competent Adult's Right To Decide Whether
A DNR Order Should Be Issued
Under the New York law, every person admitted to a hospital is presumed
to consent to the administration of CPR in the case of cardiac or respiratory
arrest. 8 The law also provides, however, that an adult with capacity may
request that his or her attending physician issue a DNR order.19 This was
one of the central recommendations of the Task Force, and the central pro-
vision of the new statute.2 °
18. The law defines cardiopulmonary resuscitation as "measures, as specified in regula-
tions promulgated by the commissioner, to restore cardiac function or to support ventilation in
the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(4). The Commis-
sioner defined cardiopulmonary resuscitation as "measures to restore cardiac function or to
support ventilation in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 10 § 405.42 (1988). The Task Force concluded that the regulations should define
CPR, as opposed to the legislation, in order to permit the flexibility needed to adjust the defini-
tion to changing medical technology and practices. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 20. The law
defines hospitalized as "the period during which a person is a patient in, or a resident of, a
hospital." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(8).
19. The law defines a DNR order as "an order not to attempt cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion in the event a patient suffers cardiac or respiratory arrest." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2961(3). For a historical review of DNR orders see Note, No-Code Orders vs. Resuscitation:
The Decision to Withold Life-Prolonging Treatment From the Terminally I11, 26 WAYNE L.
REV. 139 (1979).
The law defines an adult as "any person who is eighteen years of age or older, or is the
parent of a child, or has married." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(1).
The law defines capacity as "the ability to understand and appreciate the nature and conse-
quences of an order not to resuscitate, including the benefits and disadvantages of such an
order, and to reach an informed decision regarding the order." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2961(3).
20. The Task Force recognized that "[t]he right to decline CPR is an expression of the
person's common law right, well-recognized in this State, to direct the course of one's own
medical treatment, and not be treated without consent." TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 22,
(cites omitted). This position is consistent with New York state case law which recognizes the
right of an adult with sound mind to determine what should be done to his or her own body.
In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied sub nom.
Storar v. Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). The only common law exception to this rule is in the
case of an emergency where the person is unconscious and it is necessary to operate before
consent can be obtained. Id. Treatment without consent would therefore be considered either
a battery (see Zimmerman v. N.Y.C. Health & Hospital Corp., 91 A.D.2d 290, 458 N.Y.S.2d
552, 555 (App. Div. 1983)), or negligence (see Dries v. Gregor, 72 A.D.2d 231, 424 N.Y.S.2d
561 (App. Div. 1980)).
For background on In re Eichner and its companion case In re Storar see Comment,
Medico-Legal Implications of "Orders Not to Resuscitate," 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 515 (1982);
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There are two ways in which a patient can request a DNR order. First, an
adult with capacity, while in the hospital, may request orally that a DNR
order be issued.21 The patient's oral request must be witnessed by two per-
sons who are at least eighteen years of age, one of which must be a physician
affiliated with the hospital.22 Second, prior to or during hospitalization, an
adult with capacity can make a written decision not to accept CPR.23 The
written decision must be dated and signed by the patient and two witnesses
at least eighteen years of age; it is not required that a physician be one of the
witnesses.
Issuance of a DNR order is not automatic upon a patient's request.
Rather, before an order will be issued, the attending physician must fulfill a
number of duties and obligations.24 The attending physician must first, in
Live or Let Die: Who Decides an Incompetent's Fate? In re Storar and In re Eichner, 1982
B.Y.U. L. REV. 387 (1982).
21. The law defines a hospital as "a general hospital as defined in subdivision ten of sec-
tion twenty-eight hundred one of this chapter and a residential care facility as defined in subdi-
vision three of section twenty-eight hundred one of this chapter or a hospital as defined in
subdivision ten of section 1.03 of the mental hygiene law or a school named in section 13.17 of
the mental hygiene law." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(7). The Commissioner's rules re-
moved the word "general" from the definition of a hospital. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 10, § 405.42 (1988). See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801, 2801(3) (McKinney 1985);
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03(10), 13.17 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1987).
22. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2964(2)(a). The Task Force recommended that one of the
witnesses to the oral statement made during hospitalization be a physician affiliated with the
hospital so that the physician could make certain required determinations concerning the deci-
sion. "Since the authenticity and meaning of the oral statement must be evaluated by the
attending physician, the fact that the statement was made in the presence of a hospital physi-
cian will greatly assist that evaluation and the attending physician's willingness to rely on the
statement." TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 20.
The Task Force did not include prior oral statements which are not made in the required
context because it did not believe there was any reliable way to test the veracity and content of
such statements. Id. at 26.
23. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2964(2)(b). The law does not make any reference to the
rationale and procedures for adopting prior statements by the patient as to a CPR decision.
But see TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 25. ("Reliance on written statements must be limited,
however, to those circumstances where there is little doubt about the authenticity and applica-
bility of the instructions and no better alternative e.g., a contemporaneous statement by the
person." The Task Force would have authorized the Commissioner of Health to provide a
form to be used for this purpose.). See also id. at 25; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1,
at 245, n.47 ("If a patient, while competent anticipated a later incompetence and medical
condition, understood what should be entailed in a decision for or against resuscitation, and
made firm and explicit statements regarding the decision, then those directives should be
honored provided there is no reason to think that the patient's choice had changed or would
have changed."). The President's Commission leaves the physician responsible for assessing
whether "the patient adequately understood the ramifications of the choice and clearly stated
his or her decision." Id.
24. The law defines an attending physician as "the physician selected by or assigned to a
patient in a hospital, who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient."
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concert with a hospital-appointed physician, decide whether or not the pa-
tient is an adult as defined by the law and whether the patient has the requi-
site capacity to make such a decision.25 If the attending physician decides
that the patient is an adult with capacity under the law, the physician must
provide the patient with information about the patient's diagnosis and prog-
nosis, the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits of CPR as they pertain to
that patient, and a description of the consequences of a DNR order.26 The
attending physician must also include the patient's written statement in the
patient's medical chart, or note on the chart the patient's oral decision.
Once the attending physician has made a determination regarding adult-
hood and capacity, the physician then has the option of either issuing the
DNR order or voicing his or her opposition to the order.2 If the physician
decides that the order should be issued, the order can either be issued imme-
diately or upon the occurrence of any prerequisite medical condition speci-
fied by the patient. Upon issuance, the hospital staff responsible for the
patient's care must be notified.
If, however, the attending physician objects to the issuance of a DNR
order, the physician should immediately inform the patient of his or her
objection and the reasons underlying it.28 If the discussion between the phy-
sician and the patient does not resolve their difference of opinion, the physi-
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(2). In addition, the law provides that "where more than one
physician shares such responsibility, any such physician may act as the attending physician."
Id.
25. As used in this article, a hospital-appointed physician is a physician other than the
attending physician who is selected by a person authorized by the hospital to make such a
selection. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2963(3)(a).
26. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2962(3). The President's Commission noted that health
care professionals would require training in order to help their patients make a decision re-
garding CPR. "The education of health care professionals should ensure that they know how
to help patients and family make ethically justified decisions for or against resuscitation; those
responsible for professional licensure and certification may want to assess knowledge in these
areas." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 9. The Commission determined that there
are three values at stake in a decision regarding CPR: self-determination (the value of ex-
tending life for whatever period of time and under whatever conditions vs. an earlier death);
well-being (whether CPR will promote a patient's welfare); and equity (society's obligation to
provide an adequate level of care to all without excessive burdens). Id. at 240-44.
The Task Force, like the President's Commission, also recognized the balancing of values
which must go into a decision regarding CPR. The Task Force determined that "[t]he benefit
of extending life, often only for brief periods marked by suffering and disability, must be
weighed against an earlier, more peaceful, death." TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 7.
27. The DNR order must be effective immediately. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2964(2).
Therefore, if the patient has determined that a DNR order should be issued only when a
specified medical condition exists, the physician must determine that the specified condition
exists before issuing the order. This determination must be reflected in the patient's chart.
28. The Task Force hoped that this discussion would bring about a reconciliation of the
patient's and physician's views. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 19.
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cian has two options. The physician must either make all reasonable efforts
to arrange for the transfer of the patient to another physician,2 9 or promptly
submit the matter to the dispute mediation system established by the law.a°
There is an additional level of review involved if the patient is in or was
transferred from a mental hygiene facility."a In such a case, the facility di-
rector must be notified that the patient has consented to a DNR order before
the order can be issued.32 If the facility director concludes that the patient
lacks capacity or that the order is not in the best interests of the patient, the
facility director must submit the matter to the dispute mediation system.
The law also contains a "therapeutic exception" to the requirement that
the patient be involved in a CPR decision. In the event that the attending
physician determines that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, an
adult with capacity would suffer severe and immediate physical or mental
injury from a discussion of CPR, the physician may issue a DNR order
without first obtaining the patient's consent. 3 The law does not specify
what potential "injury" is sufficient to invoke this exception, but the Task
Force report provided some examples: a patient with arrhythmia for whom
the discussion might trigger a cardiac arrest, and a patient with severe para-
noia, depression, or suicidal tendencies who might inflict harm on himself or
herself.34
In order to take advantage of this exception, the physician must follow a
number of steps: 1) consult with and obtain the written concurrence of a
hospital-appointed physician after the appointed physician has personally
29. The Task Force reiterated the fact that while the physician is attempting to transfer
the patient, he or she still has a professional obligation not to abandon care of the patient.
TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 21.
30. This result is contrary to the recommendation of the President's Commission. Ac-
cording to the Commission, if the patient and physician disagree, "further discussion and con-
sultation are appropriate; [but] ultimately the physician must follow the patient's decision or
transfer responsibility for the patient to another physician." PRESIDENT'S COMMISsION, supra
note 1, at 8.
31. The law defines a mental hygiene facility as "a residential facility operated or licensed
by the office of mental health or the office of mental retardation and developmental disabilities.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(10).
32. Notification of the facility director should not delay issuance of the order. N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2965(6)(c).
33. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2964(3).
34. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 23. The Task Force makes clear that the therapeutic
exception is only to be used to avoid harming the patient and not to be used to avoid talking to
the patient about the dying process. Id. at 22. There is a minority report included in the Task
Force's report which was written by two members of the Task Force who disagreed with the
other members of the Task Force only on this point. The minority report argues that the
therapeutic exception articulated by the majority is too narrow. See Do Not Resuscitate Or-
ders, Minority Report of the New York State Task Force (May 1986).
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examined the patient and decided that the patient would be immediately and
severely injured by a discussion of CPR; 2) ascertain the wishes of the pa-
tient to the extent possible without causing injury; 3) include the reasons the
patient was not consulted in the patient's medical chart; and 4) if the patient
has not previously consented to a DNR order, obtain the consent of a surro-
gate.35 The attending physician is also required to reevaluate, on a regular
basis, the potential harm to the patient which might result from a discussion
of CPR. If upon reassessment the physician determines that a risk no longer
exists, the physician must consult with the patient regarding CPR.
B. Determination That An Adult Lacks Capacity
As set forth above, once an adult patient requests a DNR order, the at-
tending physician has the principal responsibility to decide, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, whether the patient has capacity to decide
whether the order should be issued.36 If the attending physician decides that
the patient lacks capacity, the physician must include in the patient's chart
the cause and nature of the patient's incapacity as well as the extent and
probable duration of the incapacity.3" A hospital-appointed physician must
also examine the patient and concur in the attending physician's assess-
35. The Task Force states that the purpose of the consultation between the physician and
the patient is not to gain consent, but to solicit the patient's wishes. TASK FORCE, supra note
9, at 23.
36. A lack of capacity shall not be presumed from the fact that a committee or a conserva-
tor has been appointed for the adult under article seventy-two or seventy-eight of the New
York mental hygiene law, or that a guardian has been appointed under article seventeen-A of
the surrogate's court procedures act. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2963(1).
As the Task Force points out, lack of capacity can include a broad spectrum of conditions.
TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 27. For example, a patient who is unconscious and cannot make
or communicate any decision lacks capacity. Id. at 27. More difficult judgements must be
made where, for example, the patient suffers from mild retardation, or the patient is elderly
and senile with intermittent lapses of lucidity. Id. at 27. The Task Force proposed that capac-
ity include cognitive and conceptual skills to recognize the importance of the decision, and
emotional development. Id. at 28.
37. If the attending physician in a general hospital determines that a patient lacks capac-
ity because of mental illness, the concurring opinion must be provided by a physician certified
or eligible to be certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2963(3)(b). If the attending physician determines that the patient lacks ca-
pacity because of a developmental disability, the concurring opinion must be provided by a
physician or psychologist who is employed by a school named in section 13.17 of the mental
hygiene law, or who has been employed a minimum of two years to render care and service in
a facility operated or licensed by the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabili-
ties, or who has been approved by the Commissioner of Mental Retardation and Developmen-
tal Disabilities in accordance with regulations promulgated by such Commissioner. N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2963(3)(c). Such regulations must require that a physician or psychologist
possess special training or three years experience in treating developmental disabilities. Id.
A determination by the attending physician that the patient lacks capacity to make a deci-
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ment.38 The hospital-appointed physician is required to note in the patient's
chart the cause and nature of the patient's incapacity, its extent and possible
duration.
When the attending and hospital-appointed physicians make a determina-
tion that the patient lacks capacity, notice, including a copy of the summary
statement to be prepared by the Commissioner of Health,39 must be given
promptly to the patient (when there is any indication that the patient will
comprehend the notice). Notice also must be given to the person highest on
the patient's surrogate list' and, if the patient is in or was transferred from a
mental hygiene facility, to the facility director.41
C. Surrogate Decision Where The Adult Patient Lacks Capacity
Where an adult who lacks capacity had, prior to losing capacity, con-
sented to a DNR order, no further approval is needed; the adult's prior deci-
sion rules.42 Conversely, where an adult lacks capacity to make a decision
regarding a DNR order and no prior decision was made by the patient re-
garding CPR, a surrogate may authorize a DNR order on behalf of the
adult.43 An adult with capacity has the right to designate a surrogate to
sion regarding CPR cannot be construed as a determination that the patient lacks capacity for
any other purpose. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2963(5).
38. The Task Force specifies that the physicians' decisions be made independently. TASK
FORCE, supra note 9, at 29. The Task Force discouraged the use of the judiciary to determine
capacity because "it does not always guarantee a better decision since the courts must ulti-
mately rely on the judgement of medical professionals." Id. at 29.
39. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
40. The surrogate list includes the person appointed by the patient, a court appointed
surrogate, the spouse, a child at least eighteen years of age, a parent, a sibling at least eighteen
years of age or a close friend. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2965(4). The surrogate will be
chosen from this list in the order listed. Id.
41. The Task Force determined that these procedures would safeguard the patient's right
to due process. See TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 30-31. For a discussion of other constitu-
tional considerations see id. at 38-39.
42. This same result would most likely have been reached prior to enactment of the law.
See Saunders v. New York, 129 Misc.2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
43. The law defines a surrogate as "the person selected to make a decision regarding re-
suscitation on behalf of another person." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(17).
Allowing a surrogate to make a life or death decision for an incompetent appears to be
contrary to the prior common law in New York. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d
64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied sub noa. Storar v. Storar 454 U.S. 858 (1981); see also New
York v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 472 N.E.2d 286, 296, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. 1984) (citing In re
Storar) ("[i]n the absence of such evidence of personal intent [there, due to the patient's incom-
petence)] a third party has no recognized right to decide that the patient's quality of life has
declined to a point where treatment should be withheld and the patient should be allowed to
die."); In re Kerr, 517 N.Y.S.2d 346, 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (citing In re Storar) ("When a
person is not competent to make such a life or death decision, the court must intervene in favor
of life prolonging treatment, despite the feelings and desires of those closest to the patient.").
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make a decision regarding CPR in the event that the patient loses capacity.
An adult with capacity may choose a surrogate in a dated, signed, writing
which is witnessed and signed by two persons who are at least eighteen years
of age. Alternatively, while in the hospital, the adult with capacity may se-
lect a surrogate orally in the presence of two witnesses eighteen years of age
or older. In the event that no surrogate has been designated (or the ap-
pointed surrogate is not reasonably available, willing and competent to make
a decision regarding a DNR order), the law provides a selection system and
authority for appointment of a surrogate. 44 The surrogate is to be selected
from the following list of persons in order of priority: 1) a person designated
by the adult patient having capacity; 2) a committee made up of the person
or guardian appointed by the court; 3) the patient's spouse; 4) a child of the
patient who is eighteen years of age or older; 5) a parent of the patient; 6) a
sibling of the patient who is eighteen years of age or older; and 7) a close
friend of the patient.4 5 Once the surrogate has been identified, the name of
the surrogate must be written into the patient's medical chart.
The surrogate is authorized to make a decision on behalf of the patient
regarding a DNR order. The surrogate's decision may be based on the pa-
tient's religious and moral beliefs or, if that information is not known, on the
basis of the patient's "best interests." The surrogate is also granted the same
rights as the patient to receive medical records and information.
The surrogate may authorize a DNR order only after the attending and
hospital-appointed physicians find, after personal examinations of the pa-
tient and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the patient has a
terminal condition,4 6 is permanently unconscious,47 that resuscitation would
44. The Task Force did not suggest requiring judicial appointment of the surrogate be-
cause "[w]hile court appointment of a guardian provides additional safeguards, including judi-
cial assessment of the surrogate's character and good faith, the judicial process is often ill-
suited for urgent medical decisions: it is too slow, too cumbersome and too costly." TASK
FORCE, supra note 9, at 32.
45. Even though the Task Force did not require appointment of the surrogate by the
judiciary, the surrogate list reflects the fact that sometimes a court will grant a conservator
authority to make health care decisions. Id. at 33.
The Task Force did not determine a selection process where there are more than one quali-
fied candidates within a surrogate class (for example, where there are three children over the
age of eighteen); it is up to the family or the dispute mediation system to resolve such disputes.
Id at 34.
The law defines a close friend as "any person eighteen years of age or older, who presents an
affidavit to an attending physician stating that he is a close friend of the patient and that he has
maintained such regular contact with the patient as to be familiar with the patient's activities,
health, and religious or moral beliefs and stating the facts and circumstances that demonstrate
such familiarity." N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(5).
46. The law defines terminal condition as "an illness or injury from which there is no
recovery, and which reasonably can be expected to cause death within one year." N.Y. PuB.
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be medically futile,48 or that resuscitation would impose an extraordinary
burden on the patient in light of the patient's medical condition and the
expected outcome of resuscitation. The physicians' findings must be included
in the patient's medical chart.
A surrogate's consent to a DNR order must be set forth in a dated writing
that is signed by the surrogate and one witness who is at least eighteen years
of age.49 Once notified, the attending physician must enter the surrogate's
decision in the patient's medical chart and either issue the DNR order and
inform the hospital staff attending the patient of the order, or make the phy-
sician's objections to the order known to the surrogate and attempt to trans-
fer the patient to another physician or submit the matter to the dispute
mediation system. If the patient is in or was transferred from a mental hy-
giene facility, the facility director must be given notice. Like the attending
physician, the facility director may submit the matter to the dispute media-
tion system if he or she determines that the patient has capacity or that the
DNR order is otherwise improper. Notice to the facility director must not
delay the issuance of the DNR order.
If the attending physician has actual notice that anyone on the surrogate
list or the facility director opposes the DNR order, the physician must sub-
mit the matter to the dispute mediation system and not issue the order. No-
tice of the DNR order must be given to the patient if there is any indication
that the patient will comprehend the order, unless a decision has been made
that such notice would harm the patient.5' If the patient objects, the DNR
HEALTH LAW § 2961(19). The Task Force emphasized that "the one year period is only a
guideline and does not require a degree of medical certainty not afforded by medical progno-
sis." TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 36.
47. The Task Force used the term "irreversibly comatose" to include all patients who
have permanently lost consciousness, including the loss of all thought, sensation and awareness
of self or environment. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 36 n.41. The Task Force found irrevers-
ibly comatose to include patients in a persistent vegetative state, patients who are completely
unresponsive after brain injury or hypoxia and fail to stabilize in a vegetative state, patients in
the end stages of degenerative neorological conditions such as Alzheimer's disease, patients
with intracranial mass lesions and patients with congenital hypoplasmia of the central nervous
system. Id. at 36.
48. The law defines medically futile as a situation where "cardiopulmonary resuscitation
will be unsuccessful in restoring cardiac and respiratory function or that the patient will expe-
rience repeated arrest in a short time period before death." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2961(9). The Task Force explained that decisions regarding whether CPR would be medi-
cally futile can be made to a reasonable degree of certainty based on statistical experiences with
CPR. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 36.
49. Under the law, the physician cannot also act as a surrogate for his or her patient.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2965(5)(d). The Task Force specifies that the physician and surro-
gate must act independently to provide greater protection for the patient. TASK FORCE, supra
note 9, at 38.
50. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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order must be revoked.
D. Issuance Of A DNR Order When The Adult Patient Lacks Capacity
And No Surrogate Is Available
If no surrogate is reasonably available, willing, or competent to make a
decision regarding a DNR order, and the adult patient who lacks capacity
has not previously expressed a decision regarding CPR, the attending physi-
cian may issue a DNR order if the physician determines in writing that, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, resuscitation would be medically fu-
tile.51 A concurring decision must be made by a hospital-appointed physi-
cian, in writing, after a personal examination of the patient. A DNR order
may also be issued pursuant to a court order.52 The patient must be given
notice of the decision to issue a DNR order if there is any indication that the
patient will be able to comprehend the decision."
E. Decision-Making On Behalf Of A Minor
The attending physician, in concert with the minor's parent or legal
guardian, must determine whether or not the minor has the capacity to
make a determination regarding CPR.54 Even if the minor has capacity to
decide in favor of a DNR order, the minor's parent or legal guardian must
concur in the decision before a DNR order can be issued. 55
If the attending physician determines that the minor lacks capacity, the
parent or legal guardian of the patient must make the decision whether or
not to issue a DNR order based on the beliefs of the minor, including the
minor's religious and moral beliefs.56 The parent or legal guardian may con-
sent to the issuance of a DNR order only after the attending physician and
the hospital-appointed physician concur in writing, after a personal exami-
nation of the patient, that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty one of
51. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2966(l)(a). This decision must be entered on the patient's
chart.
52. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2966(l)(b). See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
53. As in other contexts, if the patient is in or was transferred from a mental hygiene
facility, the facility director must be given notice and is allowed to submit the matter to the
dispute mediation system for cause. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
54. The law defines a minor as "any person who is not an adult." N.Y. PuB. HEALTH
LAW § 2961(12).
55. The Task Force report emphasized that, unlike an adult, a minor should not be pre-
sumed to have capacity because the minor's capacity may still be developing. TASK FORCE,
supra note 9, at 40. Unlike the law, the Task Force would only have allowed the minor to
"assent" as opposed to "consent." Id. at 41. The Task Force believed that assent was appro-
priate because it connotes an authority less than full consent. Id. at 41.
56. N.Y. Pua. HEALTH LAW § 2967(4)(a).
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the four specified conditions exists."' The parent or legal guardian's decision
must be made in a dated writing signed by the deciding parent or guardian
and one witness at least eighteen years of age.58 Upon notice of the written
consent of the parent or legal guardian (and minor, if appropriate), the at-
tending physician must issue the DNR order or, if the physician disagrees
with the order, make known the reasons for the disagreement and transfer
the patient to another physician.59
Where the attending physician has reason to believe that another parent
or non-custodial parent exists who has not been informed of a DNR order,
the attending physician must make a diligent effort to locate the parent and
notify the parent of the issuance of a DNR order.' If the newly-advised
parent does not consent to the DNR order, the physician must revoke any
order which has been issued and submit the matter to the dispute mediation
system.61
2. REVOCATION OF A DNR ORDER
An adult with capacity who authorized a DNR order may revoke the
order at any time by making either a written or oral statement to a physician
or member of the hospital nursing staff, or by any act evidencing specific
intent to revoke the order.62
A surrogate, parent, or legal guardian may revoke a DNR order by notify-
ing a physician or member of the hospital nursing staff in a dated, signed
writing, or by orally notifying the attending physician in the presence of one
witness who is at least eighteen years of age.6 3
Once a physician is informed of a revocation of consent, the physician
must immediately place notice of the revocation in the patient's chart, cancel
the order and notify the hospital staff responsible for the patient's care of the
rescission of the order. 6'
3. PHYSICIAN'S CONTINUING REVIEW
Once a DNR order has been issued, the attending physician must con-
57. Id. at § 2967(3).
58. Id. at 2967(4)(a).
59. Id. at § 2967(4)(b).
60. Id. at § 2967(2)(b).
61. Id. at § 2967(4)(c).
62. Id. at § 2969(1).
63. Id. at § 2969(2).
64. Id. at § 2969(3). The Task Force's recommendation differs from the law in that the
Task Force would have required that "[a]ny medical staff member informed of revocation of
the order [would be] required to record the revocation in the patient's chart and to cancel the
order immediately." TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 20.
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tinue to review the patient's chart to determine whether the order is still
appropriate in light of the patient's condition.65 If the patient is in a hospital
other than a residential health care facility, the physician must review the
patient's chart every three days. 61 For a patient in a residential care facility,
the physician must review the patient's chart each time the physician sees
the patient but not less than once every sixty days. 67 Failure to follow this
procedure would not render the DNR order moot.
If the attending physician determines that the DNR order is no longer
appropriate, the physician must immediately notify the person who con-
sented to the order.68 If that person does not revoke their consent to the
order, the physician must attempt to transfer the patient to another physi-
cian or submit the matter to the dispute mediation system.69 If the order
was consented to by a surrogate, parent, or legal guardian, and an attending
physician determines that one of the four specified conditions no longer ex-
ists,70 the physician must include such determination in the patient's chart,
cancel the order, and notify the person who gave consent and the hospital
staff of the rescission of the order.71
Additionally, if the consent was given by a surrogate and the adult patient
regains capacity at any time, the attending physician must immediately can-
cel the order and notify both the person who consented to the order and the
hospital staff,72 thereby allowing the patient to make his or her own decision.
4. INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS
If the patient for whom a valid DNR order has been issued is transferred
to a different hospital, the order remains in effect until a physician at the new
hospital cancels the order or until twenty-four hours have elapsed.7 3 The
physician at the new hospital who receives a DNR order may assume that
the order is valid and may issue a new order based on the previous order.
74
65. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2970(1).
66. Id. at § 2970(1)(a).
67. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2970(1)(b). The Task Force recommended that the order
be reviewed every thirty days, a schedule that it felt was consistent with the existing require-
ments for physicians to visit patients in nursing homes every thirty days. TASK FORCE, supra
note 9, at 22. The Task Force also recommended that if more frequent visits by a physician are
medically indicated, that the physician also review the order during those visits. Id. at 22.
68. Id. at § 2970(2)(a).
69. Id. at § 2970(2)(b).
70. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
71. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2970(b).
72. Id. at § 2970(c).
73. Id. at § 2971.
74. Id. at § 2971(2).
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5. THE DISPUTE MEDIATION SYSTEM
Each hospital must establish its own dispute mediation system.7" The sys-
tem must be set forth in writing and adopted by the hospital's governing
authority. 76 Under the law, the system may utilize any existing hospital re-
sources or it may create a new body to handle DNR orders." In addition,
with respect to disputes involving a patient who is found to lack capacity,
the system must have available to it either: 1) a physician or psychologist, or
2) a family member or legal guardian of a person having the same mental
illness (or developmental disability) as the patient, to assist in making a con-
curring determination regarding the patient's capacity.78
The dispute mediation system must be authorized to mediate any dispute
challenging consent to the issuance of a DNR order, including disputes re-
garding a patient's capacity and disputes between any combination of the
hospital, the attending physician, the patient, a surrogate, any individual on
the surrogate list, a minor, the minor patient's parent or legal guardian, a
non-custodial parent, and a facility director (if the patient is in or was trans-
ferred from a mental institution).79 The dispute mediation system is advi-
sory only; dispute mediation personnel do not have authority to decide
whether or not a DNR order should be issued .8
Once a dispute has been submitted to the dispute mediation system, no
DNR order shall be issued." If an order has already been issued, it must be
revoked.82 An order may not be issued, or reissued, until: 1) the dispute has
been resolved, 2) the mediation system has concluded its effort to resolve the
dispute, or 3) seventy-two hours have passed from the submission of the
dispute to mediation, whichever comes first.8 3 Thus, if it is to be effective,
the dispute mediation system must make a decision regarding the dispute
within seventy-two hours. When the dispute mediation system is unable to
come to a decision, whether because no conclusion can be reached or be-
75. Id. at § 2972(l)(a).
76. Id. at § 2972(l)(b).
77. Id. at § 2972(l)(b).
78. Id. at § 2972(l)(b). The Task Force reviewed the types of committees which hospitals
have been developing to deal with new medical problems and moral issues as they arise. TASK
FORCE, supra note 9, at 43. For example, most committees maintain diverse memberships
including, inter alia, physicians, nurses, clergy, lawyers, philosophers, social workers and com-
munity representatives. Id. at 43.
79. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2972(2).
80. Id. at § 2972(5). Like the law, the Task Force report specified that the dispute media-
tion system should mediate but not adjudicate disputes. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 44.
Accordingly, the decision of the system could never be binding. Id.
81. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2972(3).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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cause the seventy-two hours have expired, the attending physician must
promptly issue the DNR order if the appropriate conditions precedent still
exist and inform the hospital staff of the issuance of the order, or promptly
arrange the transfer of the patient to another physician or hospital .
4
6. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The law authorizes certain persons, by petition to a court of competent
jurisdiction, to commence a special proceeding with respect to any dispute
arising out of the law.85 A decision by a patient not to consent to a DNR
order cannot be challenged, however.16 Any challenge to a decision regard-
ing the issuance of a DNR order on the grounds that it is contrary to the
patient's wishes or best interest must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.87
The law grants the courts authority to issue an order, pursuant to the
standards applicable to the issuance of a temporary restraining order, which
shall suspend the DNR order to permit the court's review.88 No dispute can
be brought before the court without first being brought before the dispute
mediation system unless brought by the patient or by the Department of
Health or any other authorized state agency to enjoin a violation of the
law.89
The court may also review a proposed DNR order where the patient lacks
capacity and had not previously expressed a decision regarding CPR, and
there is no surrogate reasonably available, willing and competent to make a
decision on behalf of the patient.9 In this instance, the attending physician
or the hospital may commence a special proceeding, in a court of competent
jurisdiction, for a judgment directing the physician to issue a DNR order
84. IM at § 2972(4).
85. Id. at § 2973(1).
86. Id.
87. Id. The Task Force believed that, under its proposed legislation, resort to the courts
would be rare because the dispute mediation system would "enhance the quality of decisions
made by patients and physicians and minimize conflict." TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 19.
The Task Force believed that "[o]nly the highly improbable case of the otherwise healthy
patient who might fully recover from resuscitation presents the kind of conflict which is likely
to require judicial intervention." Id. at 43.
The President's Commission also clearly expressed its view that decisions regarding CPR
should not end up in court unless necessary. "[D]ecisionmaking about life-sustaining care is
rarely improved by resort to the courts." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 247.
The Commission did admit that a court is probably the "appropriate forum for serious, intrac-
table disagreements between a patient's surrogate and physician." Id. at 248.
88. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2973(2).
89. Id. at § 2973(3).
90. Id. at § 2976(1).
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where the patient has a terminal condition, is permanently unconscious, or
resuscitation would impose an extraordinary burden on the patient in light
of the patient's medical condition and the expected outcome of the resuscita-
tion.9" The court's decision must be consistent with the patient's wishes and
must be based on an examination of the patient's religious and moral beliefs
or, if not known, the best interest of the patient.92 The law does not pre-
clude a court of competent jurisdiction from approving the issuance of a
DNR order under circumstances other than those described in the law.
93
7. IMMUNITY
The law provides immunity from criminal prosecution, civil liability or
from charges of unprofessional conduct for all hospital personnel where the
personnel acted in good faith under the law.94 Additionally, hospital per-
sonnel cannot be held liable for criminal prosecution, civil liability or
charges of unprofessional conduct where the individual provided CPR and
there was a DNR order in effect if the person was reasonably and in good
faith unaware of the DNR order or reasonably and in good faith thought
that the consent to a DNR order had been revoked. 95 Additionally, no indi-
vidual can be subjected to criminal prosecution or civil liability for con-
senting or declining to consent to the issuance of a DNR order where the
decision was made in good faith.96 Mediators are also protected from crimi-
nal prosecution, civil liability or charges of unprofessional conduct for acts
performed in good faith as a dispute mediator.
97
CONCLUSION
The New York State law implements practices which are very close to
those recommended by both the New York State Task Force on Life and
Law and the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at § 2976(2).
94. Id. at § 2974(1). Accordingly, the physician would not be granted immunity if he or
she failed to meet the applicable standards of skill and care in making the medical diagnosis
required by the law. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 52. Hospital personnel granted immunity
include any physician, health care professional, nurse's aide, hospital, or person employed by
or under contract to a hospital. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2974.
95. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2974(2)(a),(b). Under New York state case law, the phy-
sician would have been held liable in damages for any treatment performed without the compe-
tent patient's consent. See In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266, cert. denied sub noma. 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
96. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2974(3).
97. Id. at § 2974(4).
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Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. It is a comprehensive,
well thought out law which codifies in part and changes in part the common
law. The law is designed to protect medical personnel and the dispute
mediators, as well as the patient and the patient's family. Backers of the
statute hope that by protecting all involved, the hysteria revolving around
DNR orders will be alleviated and the orders will be used where appropriate.
Susan M. Golden

